This paper reviews the latest research and analyses related to the risk assessment of ship-FPSO collision. The focus is placed on: existing criteria, FPSO collision accident, design scenarios for FPSO collision, mechanics of collision incidents, consequences and acceptance criteria. The research achievements of ships' collision and grounding since 1990s are introduced. Issues specific to ship-FPSO collisions that deserve further development are addressed. The content of this paper is mainly drawn from the ISSC 2006 Specialist Committee V.1 on Collision and Grounding.
INTRODUCTION
For offshore structures, risk can be measured by loss of life, loss of property, environmental pollution, costs of loss of production, etc. Mitigating risks can be achieved through reducing the probability of accident occurrence and/or minimizing the consequences of such accidents.
Risk analysis is a tool that is increasingly applied in the marine and offshore industries to manage safety, health and environmental protection. For offshore structures, ship collisions are low probability, high consequence events. The collision risk assessment includes the knowledge of accident occurring frequency. This may be estimated in a navigational area, comparing experience or extrapolation from historical data. The consequences would be measured in terms of structural damage, the number of fatalities and injuries, the amount of material released to sea, the immediate impact on environmental resources, and the subsequent costs of restoration.
Risk minimizing measures include a combination of actions that reduce the frequency and consequences of accidents. Those assessing the risk normally prioritize measures that are adopted to reduce the number of hazardous situations that may cause an accident. On the other hand, because the consequences of accidents are so serious, we must develop crashworthy structural designs and develop consequence reducing arrangements, regulations and requirements.
Most of the current risk assessments for offshore structures have been devoted to some specific aspects of collision. Comprehensive accident models that combine the likelihood of being in an incident and the undesirable consequences to life, property and environment are scarce.
This paper reviews the latest research and analyses related to risk assessment of ship-FPSO collision. The contents of the paper are mainly based on the 16th International Ship and Offshore Structures Congress (ISSC) Specialist Committee V.1 Collision and Grounding. See Frieze and Shenoi (2006) .
The committee mandate was: Concern for structural arrangements on ships and floating structures with regard to their integrity and adequacy in the event of collision and grounding, with the view towards risk assessment and management. Consideration shall be given to the frequency of occurrence, the probabilistic and physical nature of such accidents, and consequences on watertight integrity, structural integrity and environment.
The focus of the paper is placed on: existing criteria, FPSO collision accident, design scenarios for FPSO collision, mechanics of collision incidents, consequences and acceptance criteria. This report intends to cover the latest research achievements, especially the development in the studies on ship collision since 1990, which provide useful information that will help further research and development in risk assessment of ship-FPSO collisions.
EXISTING CRITERIA IN OFFSHORE DESIGN CODES
Vessel collision during normal operations is one of the accidental loading possibilities. Figure 1 shows a damaged fixed platform that suffered from a vessel collision.
The vessel collision scenario for platforms in the Gulf of Mexico is one when a 1,000-ton supply vessel collides, either head-on or broadside, with the platform at a speed of 0.5 m/s. The vessel is chosen to represent typical OSVs in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. This API RP requires that the platform survive the initial collision, and meet the post-impact criteria. During the described collision, the offshore structure absorbs energy primarily from localized plastic deformation of the tubular wall, elastic/plastic bending, and elongation of the member. In addition, if the fendering device is fitted, then there is global platform deformation, in addition to ship deformation and/or rotation.
After collision, the damaged platform should retain sufficient residual strength to withstand one-year environmental storm loads in addition to normal operation loads. In the North Sea (see, e.g., NTS 1999 , ISO 2005a ), the collision is described as one from a vessel of 5,000 tons with a drifting speed of 2.0 m/s (DNV 2001) . The collision energy is 14 MJ for a broad-side collision and 11 MJ for a head-on collision. Appendix A summarizes the offshore design codes that are related to ship collision designs.
There are some limited reports on ship-to-platform collision and the consequential risks to the damaged structures. Experts recognize that ship collisions are not likely to cause the push-over failure of collided manned platforms that lose some individual structural members, especially in a benign environment. However, minimum structures may see rapid deterioration of the overall structural integrity if impact damages are left un-repaired (Grewal and Lee 2004) .
CONSIDERING SHIP COLLISION RISKS IN DESIGN
Essentially, the principles of collision design standards would be composed of the following elements:
• How and why accidents occur: navigation, accident scenarios, probability of occurrence of certain types of accidents.
• What happens (structurally) when a collision occurs: structural mechanics in collisions.
• What are the consequences of structural damage: property damages, environmental damages, and loss of life.
• How can each of the above be addressed: accident prevention, minimization of structural damage, mitigation of damage consequence, response to damage and loss of life.
As represented by the Recommended Practice of the American Petroleum Institute (API), the offshore industry has established systemic assessment procedures for fixed platforms that address the probability of occurrence, risk ranking, structural analyses, and acceptance criteria. (Wang et al. 2003) The API recommends evaluating the structural performance of (fixed) platforms that suggest a high risk to life safety and/or the possibility of failure when there is a fire, blast or accidental loading (see API Recommended Practice 2A-WSD, API 2000). This API RP specifies the following assessment tasks for evaluating the events (fire, blast, and accidental loading) that could occur to the platform over its intended service life and service function(s):
• Task 1, assign a platform exposure category for the platform • Task 2, assign risk levels to the probability of the event • Task 3, determine the appropriate level of risk for the selected platform and event
• Task 4, conduct further study or analyses to better define the risk, consequence and cost of mitigation • Task 5, reassign a platform exposure category and/or mitigate the risk or the consequence of the event • Task 6, assess structural integrity if the platform is considered high-risk A survey of international bridge projects (Gluver & Olsen 1998 ) reveals that efforts have been made to minimize the risk of collisions to bridges, bridge users, and the environment. To reduce risk, both bridge safety and navigational safety need to be addressed. A risk analysis requires:
• Establishment of a realistic representation of the navigational activity, • Conditions and practice that can be expected once the bridge has been built, • Selection of a design collision scenario (e.g., ship size, speed) to measure collision severity, • Assessment of consequences such as structural failure, • User fatalities and environmental pollution, • Acceptance criteria establishment (preferably prior to commencement of risk analyses), and • Evaluation of preventative and protective measures.
Building on the experiences of ship collision analyses for the Great Belt Bridge, Pedersen (2002) presented a systematic methodology for addressing collision risk for fixed installations close to highdensity shipping lanes. Causation factors and the number of collision candidate ships are taken into account. Traffic of different ship types, length, and loading conditions are based on statistical data.
FPSO COLLISION INCIDENTS
An FPSO has a typical tanker shape and therefore uses the structural designs of tankers. There have been several ship impacts with FPSOs. In five incidents, shuttle tankers caused the impact; and one near contact of a shuttle tanker was reported. None of these impacts were critical, and in fact, the consequences were marginal. There are also reports of offloading shuttle tankers colliding with FPSOs in the North Sea. The most severe shuttle tanker impact so far involved energy of 37 MJ (BOMEL 1999) .
Compared to many fixed installations that are supported by truss construction, an FPSO has a higher level of structural redundancy, and therefore can survive a high level of collision impact energy (Wang et al 2003) . Analyses of collision resistance can be based on fundamental methods and approaches covered in Sections 5.2 to 5.4, and Skallerund and Amdahl (2002) . Moan et al (2002) reported that the critical energy for penetrating the wing tanker of an FPSO that is 40 m wide and 21 meters deep is about 8 to 18 MJ when the FPSO is struck by a 42,000 DWT tanker; 40 to 55 MJ when the FPSO is struck by a 18,000 DWT tanker; and 57 MJ when its engine room is penetrated by a tandemly moored shuttle tanker. These figures are indicative of the energy's magnitude. Many other influential factors, such as striking bow designs, also play a role, and therefore collision situations should be treated on a case by case basis. 
FPSO COLLISION SCENARIOS
FPSOs have a risk profile different from fixed platforms and commercial trading tankers because they are stationed in one location and are routinely visited by supply boats and shuttle tankers. FPSOs can be struck by these vessels. In addition, passing ships also pose a collision risk if an FPSO is close to a sailing route. Three main scenarios require detailed assessment , Wang et al 2003 :
• Visiting supply vessels (high frequency and low consequences), • Passing vessel collision (low frequency and high consequences), and • Offloading shuttle tankers (medium frequency with high potential consequences). (1999) presented an analysis on collision risks in the Gulf of Mexico. Classification societies such as ABS, DnV, LR and NK also maintain vessel incident databases. Generally, these in-house databases cover other geographical areas as well, but are not confined to offshore installations.
Supply vessel collisions
In an analysis of a collision between a supply vessel and an FPSO in West Africa, Oh et al (2005) assumed that a collision could occur in three places: on the riser, the protector, and the deflector. They chose to look into collisions that induce large deformations on the framed structure at a colliding speed of 1 m/s. They estimated that the speed was a result of marine equipment failure or human error.
Passing vessel collisions
Occurrence probability of passing vessel collisions can not be fully captured using only historical incident data. Very limited data are available. Even though there are some, the presence of an offshore installation will absolutely affect the likelihood of future incidents.
There is increasing interest in developing techniques combining historical data with an analytical model because historical data can not always be used for predicting the future. This is especially true for passing vessel collisions because the traffic pattern varies from one location to another. Haugen (1998) described a conceptual route-based model for an annual collision frequency rate per year for a given installation.
Shuttle tanker collisions
A few incidents of shuttle tanker collisions have occurred, but the likelihood of this type of accident is very difficult to specify from sparse historical data. Often, expert opinions are the only choice that decision makers have when there is very little data of previous incidents. Recently, Chen (2003) and Chen et al (2002 Chen et al ( , 2003 reported a simulation-based approach that showed promise as a potential alternative to simply collecting expert opinions. This new approach adopts operation simulators widely used in training crews for predicting how close a shuttle tanker may come to an FPSO during an offloading operation. With a large number of simulations of offloading operations, the relative motion between an FPSO and an offloading tanker can be fit into some statistical models. Then, the probability of collision can be estimated based on those outcomes.
Incident occurrence frequencies may be determined through: 1) statistics from historical data, 2) expert opinions, 3) predictive calculation, and 4) risk analysis as indicated in Table 1 .
DESIGN EVENTS FOR FPSO COLLISION
Moan et al (2002) generated an energy spectrum that showed the cumulative collision frequencies versus the energy generated by a collision, with the event corresponding to a specified annual exceedance probability of e.g. 10 -4 . The most probable impact locations (bow, stern, side) and impact geometry should be established based on the dimensions and geometry of the structure (FPSO) and of the impacting vessel. It should also account for draught variations, the operational sea-state, and vessel motions.
Collision scenarios involve:
• supply vessel (OSV) impacts,
• relatively less frequent shuttle tanker impacts when in tandem to offloading operations, and • passing vessel collisions. Colliding supply ships may cause penetration of the side shell, but it is unlikely to penetrate the inner skin causing oil outflow or overall hull girder failure. Stern impact by a tandem shuttle tanker is a possible event and may cause flooding of the aft machinery room and damage to the aft flare tower. Collisions caused by passing vessels are dependent on the location of the FPSO relative to ship lanes. Studies on sites in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico show that the annual impact probability may vary from about 10 -3 down to 10 -6 or less. Such impacts may be caused by vessels traveling at high speeds that have large mass, and may result in significant impact energy and damage potential. Therefore, we can predict that it will cause flooding and outflow from one or two wing tanks, and a center tank.
A more frequently occurring event is contact with offshore supply vessels. A contact accident is called by some as low-energy collision.
Normally, the consequences are much less severe. See Wang et al. (2006) .
MECHANICS OF SHIP COLLISION
Accident analysis mechanics can be classified into two parts -external mechanics and internal mechanics. The external accident mechanics deal with the rigid body global motion of the colliding structures under the force of the collision and the hydrodynamic pressures acting on the wet surface. The internal accident mechanics evaluates the structural failure response during the collision accident. Those two parts are often treated separately, but in some cases, they are solved together.
EXTERNAL MECHANICS
For the calculation of the motion of the ship, and possibly also of the offshore structure, during the collision event, one choice is time simulation (see Brown 2002) . Another possibility is to use a simpler theory based on the classical rigid body dynamics. Such a simplified analytical procedure was presented in Pedersen and Zhang (1998) for the outer collision dynamics, i.e., for determination of the energy released for crushing during ship collisions. As an example of the results of a rigid body outer dynamic analysis, a situation may be considered of a ship drifting against a leg of a jack-up rig at an initial velocity V = 2 m/s in a direction normal to the impact surface. For this situation, the calculated energy losses released for crushing of the involved ship structure are presented in Fig. 2 . The energy ratio is defined as the ratio between energy released for crushing of the supply vessel to a total kinetic energy of the supply vessel before collision. It is seen that the impact energy to be spent by crushing is reduced by up to 80 per cent from a collision location amidships (d/L=0) to a collision at a point near the stern or the bow (d/L=0.5 or -0.5). It is also seen that it is important to include the motion or the flexibility of the struck structure. 
STRUCTURAL DAMAGES IN A COLLISION
When the ship type and size and the energy released for crushing are known, the next step in a consequence analysis is to determine the energy released in crushing the striking and struck structures.
The analysis methods of structural damages (or internal mechanisms) can be categorized into four groups:
• simple formulae, • simplified analytical approach,
• simplified FEM, and • nonlinear FEM simulation.
Their advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Table 2 (modified from Wang et al 2003) .
Simple formulae are best suited to estimate initial energy absorption. The recent extensive studies on structural crashworthiness have produced many new simplified formulae that are more rationally based and are applicable to a wider range of problems , Simonsen and Tornqvist 2004a , Pedersen et al. 1998 , Wang and Yi 1997 , Li 1997 , PAFA 2002 .
Simplified analytical methods are best at balancing modeling difficulty with prediction accuracy. The technological advances in the last decade are represented by the establishment of the structural crashworthiness concept and methodology (Wierzbicki 1991 , Wang 2002 . This group of approaches has the advantage of capturing the basic characteristics of structural crashworthiness with minimized structural modeling efforts. A series of methods has been developed using this advanced technology. Some have been yielding results of practical importance (e.g., Zhang 1999 , Wang and Ohtsubo 1999 , Pedersen and Zhang 2000b , Suzuki et al 2000 , Tikka 2001 , Brown 2002 , Urban 2003 , Han et al 2005 , Zhang and Wu 1990 , Zhu et al 1996 , Liang et al 2000 , Xiao et al 2001 . reported analyses of plate crushing and ship bow damage in head-on collisions, and reviewed and compared existing experimental and theoretical studies on crushing analyses of plated structures.
Simple formulae for determining the crushing force, force-deformation curve and the extent of damage to a ship bow, expressed in terms of ship principal particulars, are derived for longitudinally stiffened oil tankers and bulk carriers. These formulae can be used in a probabilistic analysis of how much damage occurs from ship collisions when a large number of calculations are generally required.
Simplified FEM (e.g., Paik at al 1999) has not been used much.
Application of nonlinear FEM simulation has been the main theme of recent studies (Wu et al 2004 , Zhang L. et al 2004 , Yamado and Endo 2004 , Endo 2004 , Jiang and Gu 2004 , Tornqvist and Simonsen 2004 , Wang et al 2003 , 2002b , Le Sourne et al 2003 , Kajaste-Rudnitski et al 2004a , 2004b , Nolau Neto et al 2004 , Jastrzebski et al 2004 , Lehmann and Biehl 2004 , Konter et al 2004 , Oh et al 2005 , Liu and Gu 2003 , Lee et al 2001 , Klanac et al 2005 , Ozguc et al 2005 , Hu et al 2005 , Alsos and Amdahl 2005 , Yamada et al 2005 . This trend was clearly demonstrated in the 2nd and 3rd International Conference on Collision and Grounding of Ships.
As expected, we will see more FEM simulation applications in the coming years. Rapid advances in computer technology and software capacity have made FEM simulation a preferred choice. Many powerful special-purpose FEM packages, such as DYNA3D, DYTRAN and PAM-CRASH, are now available and can account for large deformation, contact between structures, non-linearity in material properties, and rupture. For analyzing a collision accident involving high non-linearity, contact, friction and rupture, the explicit methodology is suitable.
The required calculation efforts are fewer than the commonly used implicit methods. Convergence of calculations is much easier to realize. Figure 3 shows an example of simulated structural damages.
CONSEQUENCES AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Consequences of a ship-FPSO collision are measured by oil spills and environmental impact, residual strength of the installation, and repair costs, among others.
The environmental impacts from spilled oil have been the main concerns and there are some studies conducted to investigate this issue (MMS 2001) .
There is no formalized acceptance criterion for an FPSO collision, especially not for structural designs. Relevant studies are limited.
In theory, the optimal structure is found by minimizing the expected loss for a given functionality and thereby allowing maximum freedom for the designer. This approach is difficult to apply with today's design tools. Therefore, in reality, the riskbased approaches are often aiming at complying with a pre-specified level of risk. This risk level can be expressed for the entire system such that the designer is allowed to place the risk contributions freely. Alternatively, specific limits can be set on risks associated with ship collisions (for example), or by specific requirements to the energy absorption of the offshore structure as illustrated in Table A . There are guidelines available for risk reduction options, such as UKOOA's guidelines for collision avoidance (UKOOA 2003) . Guidance for structural designs against ship collision is yet to formalize.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section lists the conclusions and recommendations of ISSC 2006 V.1 that are relevant to ship-FPSO collision risk assessment.
Structural crashworthiness:
The concept and methodology of structural crashworthiness are maturing and have reached a level where they can be applied in analyses and evaluations of a wide range of collision scenarios. The committee advocates more application and recommends refinement of analysis approaches.
Probability of collisions:
Future research should focus on developing risk-based software. The software should be capable of rationally modeling the cost and risk reduction features of each risk control option. The calculated cost of these risk reducing measures must then be compared with savings from calculated reductions in expenses.
Risk assessment: Risk assessment approaches are well suited to ship-FPSO collision analysis, and are expected to continuously stand in the center of future development. The committee recommends focusing on integrating predictive calculation tools, including the development of streamlined software/programs.
Rule and regulation development: Future rules and regulations on collisions need to address:
• Design incident/accident scenarios, • Responses (of ships, offshore installations, bridges, etc) to an incident/accident, and • Consequences, and • Acceptance criteria.
Predictive calculation approaches:
Topics that will further refine these methods include:
• Rupture strain, and • Post-accident loads (both still-water and dynamic loads). 
